Why the Quantum Threat Is Real Today
The cryptographic algorithms protecting most digital communications — RSA, ECDSA, Diffie-Hellman — are based on mathematical problems classical computers cannot solve in a practical timeframe. A sufficiently powerful quantum computer running Shor's algorithm can solve these problems efficiently — breaking the encryption protecting banking transactions, government communications, pharmaceutical intellectual property and personal data.
Quantum computers capable of breaking current 2048-bit RSA at operational scale do not yet exist. But this does not mean organisations can wait to act.
The Harvest-Now-Decrypt-Later Threat
The most immediate quantum threat is not an attacker using a quantum computer to break today's encryption — it is an attacker harvesting encrypted data today and storing it for decryption when quantum computers become available. For any data remaining sensitive for more than five years — medical records, intellectual property, government intelligence, long-term financial data — the harvest-now-decrypt-later threat is real and active now.
Nation-state adversaries are known to be conducting HNDL collection against high-value targets. Data encrypted today with current algorithms may be decrypted by adversaries in 2032 or 2035. The sensitivity of that data at that future date determines the urgency of migration today.
NIST Post-Quantum Cryptography Standards
| Standard | Algorithm | Use Case | Status |
|---|---|---|---|
| FIPS 203 | ML-KEM (Kyber) | Key encapsulation / key exchange — primary PQC standard | NIST standard, Aug 2024 |
| FIPS 204 | ML-DSA (Dilithium) | Digital signatures — authentication and integrity | NIST standard, Aug 2024 |
| FIPS 205 | SLH-DSA (SPHINCS+) | Digital signatures — hash-based conservative alternative | NIST standard, Aug 2024 |
| Draft FIPS 206 | FN-DSA (Falcon) | Digital signatures — compact for constrained environments | Draft standard |
The Six-Step PQC Migration Programme
- Cryptographic inventory. Identify every algorithm in use — in applications, APIs, databases, network infrastructure, IoT devices and embedded systems. Include vendor-supplied software where you may not have visibility of the underlying cryptographic implementation.
- Data sensitivity classification. Not all data requires immediate PQC protection. Classify by sensitivity and longevity. Data remaining sensitive beyond 2030 that is encrypted today is the highest priority for early migration.
- Crypto-agility assessment. Assess how easily systems can transition to new algorithms. Systems with crypto-agility can migrate faster and more cheaply than those with hard-coded cryptographic dependencies.
- Vendor roadmap assessment. Most cryptographic functionality comes from vendors — security infrastructure providers, CAs, cloud platforms, HSM manufacturers. Assess key vendors' PQC roadmaps and align your timeline to their product delivery.
- Hybrid cryptography implementation. During transition, implement hybrid cryptography — classical and PQC algorithms in parallel — for highest-priority systems. This protects against both classical and quantum threats during the migration period.
- Migration programme execution. Execute in priority order: highest-sensitivity, longest-lived data first. Plan for 5–10 years of migration effort for large complex organisations.
Cyber security specialists. PQC readiness assessment within 48 hours.